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KATJA MELLMANN 
Objects of ›Empathy‹ 
Characters (and Other Such Things) as Psycho-Poetic Effects 
In folk theories of art reception, readers and cinema audiences are said to 
experience fictional worlds vicariously ›through‹ characters, i.e. they 
›identify‹ themselves with them, they partake in their experiences 
›empathetically‹. In the first section of my essay, I will argue that it is not 
character but focalization (point of view) which, on a fundamental level, 
guides our fictional experience, and I will exemplify several ways that 
characters (or similar ideas) can then in addition come into play. In the 
next two sections, I will discuss possible cognitive correlates of both the 
textual device of focalization and textual clues indicating ›persons‹. The 
aim is to show that what I call ›psycho-poetic effects‹ (that is, the mental 
representation of anthropomorphic instances) are best described as by-
products of various cognitive programs involved in the reception of 
narrative fiction. ›Empathy‹, as it is understood in the above mentioned 
folk theory of art reception, can then be analysed into individual 
algorithms of social cognition. And it can be differentiated, as is done in 
the last section, from other phenomena often confused with it, like 
emotional experience proper and emotional contagion. Also, I refer to the 
idea that mirror neurons provide the means to empathize with others, 
literary characters included. My general proposition is to revise and refine 
those concepts with the help of evolutionary theory and, thus, to 
hypothesize as cognitive correlates for textual features only programs 
specific enough to be correlated with a specific adaptive function which 
they may have performed in the process of human evolution. 
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1  Focalization – The Door of ›Perception‹ 
What if there are no characters at all? I start with several passages from 
the first chapter of Virginia Woolf’s novel Jacob’s Room (1922) in order to 
show how the imagination of a fictional world can arise independently 
from the presence of fictional characters, and to discuss various ways the 
idea of ›character‹, or of character-like entities, might come into play. The 
textual device I suggest as an alternative to character in explaining 
imagination processes is as old as the narratological concept of 
›perspective‹ or ›point of view‹, though I refer to it in the more specific 
definition of »a restriction of ›field‹« as introduced by Gérard Genette.1 
His notion of ›focalization‹ designates the somewhat skeletonized,2 mere 
technical fact of ›perception‹ without implicitly suggesting – as ›perspec-
tive‹ and ›point of view‹ tended to – that it is someone’s perception.  
In the following text passage Woolf depicts an empty room. There is 
no character aboard, we are alone with this sight:  
The bareness of Mrs. Pearce’s front room was fully displayed at ten o’clock at night 
when a powerful oil lamp stood on the middle of the table. The harsh light fell on the 
garden; cut straight across the lawn; lit up a child’s bucket and a purple aster and 
reached the hedge. Mrs. Flanders had left her sewing on the table. There were her large 
reels of white cotton and her steel spectacles; her needle-case; her brown wool wound 
round an old postcard. There were the bulrushes and the Strand magazines; and the 
linoleum sandy from the boys’ boots. A daddy-long-legs shot from corner to corner 
and hit the lamp globe. The wind blew straight dashes of rain across the window, which 
flashed silver as they passed through the light. A single leaf tapped hurriedly, persistent-
ly, upon the glass. There was a hurricane out at sea.3 
The perceiving instance (Genette’s ›situated focus‹ or ›focal position‹)4 is 
clearly located in the room,5 so that it can view the ›powerful oil lamp […] 
on the middle of the table‹ and the other objects in the room (including 
the daddy-long-legs) as well as the garden outside the window, and that it 
_____________ 
1  Genette: Revisited, p. 74. 
2  Cf. Genette: Discourse, pp.  189–194; Genette: Revisited, pp.  72–78. As there are 
various conceptions of that term in post-genettian narrative theory (and as Genette 
himself was not all consistent), see also Mellmann: Voice, for my preferred under-
standing of ›focalization‹. 
3  Woolf: Jacob’s Room, p. 7. 
4  Genette: Revisited, p. 74; Genette: Discourse, p. 193. Cf. also O’Neill: Origin, p. 333, 
who speaks of the »point from which the narrative is perceived as being presented at 
any given moment«. 
5  The notions of ›perceiving instance‹/›uttering instance‹ and ›perceptual situa-
tion‹/›situation of utterance‹, were developed in Mellmann: Emotionalisierung, 
pp. 164–204. 
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can hear the leaf tapping at the window pane. However, the last sentence 
makes a small exception.  
Theoretically, there are two possible analyses of this sentence, though 
one of them is more probable to take shape in the mind of a reader: 
(a) The scope of perception can be said to be widened and displaced out 
at sea, so that the perceiving instance can see that there is a hurricane. 
(b) Or the sentence can be categorized as a voice-only passage, that is, a 
comment by the narrator (the ›voice‹ in Genette’s terms), simply speaking 
out of his knowledge (as he does, for instance, when he tells us how it comes 
that there are sewing utilities lying around, and sand on the floor). 
Option  (b) is more likely to represent the understanding of empirical 
readers, because such a huge shift in imagination as required by (a) would 
take some time, and one single and short sentence does not really give 
time enough to fully flesh out the second perceptual situation. A second 
reason might be, as I will argue below, that we prefer focalizing strategies 
which mimic natural human movement, and a camera shift out at sea 
would clearly exceed these limits. So, in order to keep up with the pace of 
narration and a humanlike scope of experience, it would be easier to stay 
with the idea of the perceiving instance being in the room and to regard 
the last sentence as a mere comment on the perception of the tapping leaf.  
But if we do so, something odd is taking place: For who makes this 
comment? Obviously, this is the ›voice‹, ergo, the ›narrator‹. But the 
special thing about this comment is that it is made directly in response to a 
perception. That is, the narrator behaves as if he himself is standing in the 
room (just in the place where the perceiving instance is assumed to be) 
and commented about his own perceptions. The sentence ›There was a 
hurricane out at sea‹ sounds like a thought someone might have standing 
there and hearing the leaf tapping at the window. Grammatically, it could 
even be read as a case of free indirect discourse, albeit there is no 
character to whom we could ascribe this reflection. Especially by using the 
deictic phrase ›out at‹, the voice adopts the angle of the perceiving 
instance. Similarly, the circumstances that ›Mrs. Flanders had left her 
sewing on the table‹ and that the ›linoleum [was] sandy from the boys’ 
boots‹ are told in a way that makes them sound like the thoughts of 
somebody who sees the sewing lying on the table, the sand on the floor, 
and then guesses that it is Mrs. Flanders’ sewing and sand from the boys’ 
boots. 
I call this something odd because voice-only passages do not always 
transfer the narrator into the perceptual situation. Imagine a sentence like: 
›The bareness of the front room in Mrs. Pearce’s house, which was built in 
1891, was fully displayed at ten o’clock at night‹. Again the narrator simply 
speaks out of his knowledge when telling us when the house was built 
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(something which cannot be actually perceived). But in this example, the 
voice-only passage gives additional information, which has no close relation 
to the perceptual situation, and thus evokes the idea of an omniscient 
narrator external to the fictional world (Genette’s ›heterodiegetic 
narrator‹). In Woolf’s original text we have a heterodiegetic narrator too 
(for none of the characters is identical with the narrator), but what is 
peculiar is that he often adopts the role of a quasi-homodiegetic narrator 
by aligning himself with the perceiving instance. This is quite akin to what 
Franz K. Stanzel called the ›figural narrative situation‹:6 The impression of 
a ›figural‹ narrator is brought about by a particular narrative technique 
involving a tendency toward anthropomorphic focalization (that is, 
movements of the perceiving instance which mimic, or at least do not 
exceed, human capabilities of moving) and for a ›subsidiary voice system‹, 
which means that the voice does not make itself noticeable as a particular 
person, but rather ties itself down to a mere reflector function, adding no 
other comments than of the above kind, i.e. closely related to the 
perceptual situation.7  
The perceiving instance, as a technical concept, can at heart be under-
stood as kind of a camera (plus microphone, smell, touch and taste 
recorder). But we often treat it as if it was a personal entity, an incorporeal 
›somebody‹ or vicarious ›I‹ witnessing the fictional events (standing in the 
empty front room of Mrs. Pearce’s house, for example). Especially if its 
spatio-temporal access and its way of moving resembles human 
capabilities, we tend to imagine a ›figural‹ perceiver. This bias (or, ›fallacy‹) 
of anthropomorphizing the perceiving instance often entails another bias: 
to synthesize this ›somebody‹ with any available ›subject‹ in the text. If 
there is no character, like in the quoted passage,8 the only available 
›subject‹ is that of the narrator, that is, the person we assume – again 
anthropomorphizing  – is behind the ›voice‹ of a narrative. As   
_____________ 
6  Stanzel: Situations; Stanzel: Theory. For a survey see also Fludernik / Margolin: 
Introduction. 
7  Cf. Mellmann: Voice, pp. 125–129. 
8  Or if they are not able to function as perceivers, for example, if they are sleeping: »The 
little boys in the front bedroom had thrown off their blankets and lay under the sheets. 
It was hot; rather sticky and steamy. Archer lay spread out, with one arm striking 
across the pillow. […] In the other bed by the door Jacob lay asleep, fast asleep, 
profoundly unconscious« (Woolf: Jacob’s Room, p. 9). It would be unreasonable to 
ascribe the perception that ›it was hot‹, ›sticky and steamy‹, to the boys (although they 
might feel it even sleeping), so again the narrator has to fill this space. 
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Bortolussi/Dixon have observed, empirical readers indeed tend to 
synthesize ›narrator‹ and ›perceiver‹ in their imagination.9  
Authors exploit these biases by unfolding a versatile back and forth of 
potential attributions. Here is another example from Jacob’s Room:  
The rock was one of those tremendously solid brown, or rather black, rocks which 
emerge from the sand like something primitive. Rough with crinkled limpet shells and 
sparsely strewn with locks of dry seaweed, a small boy has to stretch his legs far apart, 
and indeed to feel rather heroic, before he gets to the top.  
But there, on the very top, is a hollow full of water, with a sandy bottom; with a blob of 
jelly stuck to the side, and some mussels. A fish darts across. The fringe of yellow-
brown seaweed flutters, and out pushes an opal-shelled crab – ›Oh, a huge crab‹, Jacob 
murmured – and begins his journey on weakly legs on the sandy bottom. Now! Jacob 
plunged his hand. The crab was cool and very light.10  
The quoted passage is separated from its preceding paragraph by an 
asterisk, indicating kind of a cutaway from the chapter’s initial scenery to 
another place on the beach. Starting with the description of a rock, the 
passage seems to exhibit a scene again void of characters, and the reader 
will probably begin with the idea of an anonymous perceiving instance 
which is installed in front of the rock. However, beginning at the latest 
with ›But there‹, he will imagine it as a strongly ›figural‹ narrator-perceiver, 
because the ›But‹ does not make sense except in relation to a psychic 
entity, to which the perception of the water hollow on the top of the rock 
would mean a sudden discovery. This anthropomorphization of the 
perceiving instance is further supported by the switch to present tense, 
which evokes the imagination of someone really being there. Not before 
the third paragraph, though, do we understand that this ›someone‹ is 
Jacob, and that already the considerations of how much ›a small boy‹, of all 
things, ›has to stretch his legs‹ might have been due to this fact. Thus, only 
retrospectively does the reader become aware that he has been seeing the 
rock all along ›through Jacob’s eyes‹, and that the passage is, in Genette’s 
terms, ›internally focalized‹.  
Both examples make clear that, if there was not access to the fictional 
world independent from characters, texts like the quoted ones would not 
work. The first one, lacking any characters, would not give rise to any 
imagination at all. In the second one, Woolf would not be able to suspend 
_____________ 
9  Bortolussi / Dixon: Psychonarratology, pp.  166–199. Yet I do not follow their 
conclusion that Genette’s distinction of voice and perception therefore »loses […] 
relevance« (p.  172) as an analytical concept, because how are we to make that 
important observation (that readers tend to synthesize voice and perception instance) 
without this distinction?  
10  Woolf: Jacob’s Room, p. 5. 
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the communication of Jacob’s presence until the end of the passage. Only 
the existence of a textual device called focalization allows her to start as if 
there were no character, and to make a game out of letting the perceiver 
become more and more ›figural‹, and finally Jacob. 
The fact that ›focalization‹ and ›character‹ are only loosely connected 
and can combine differently in different cases becomes particularly 
apparent in the following passage:  
›Ja-cob! Ja-cob!‹ Archer shouted. 
›Scarborough‹, Mrs. Flanders wrote on the envelope, and dashed a bold line beneath; it 
was her native town; the hub of the universe. But a stamp? She ferreted in her bag; then 
held it up mouth downwards; then fumbled in her lap, all so vigorously that Charles 
Steele in the Panama hat suspended his paint-brush. 
Like the antennae of some irritable insect it positively trembled. Here was that woman 
moving – actually going to get up – confound her! He struck the canvas a hasty violet-
black dab. For the landscape needed it. It was too pale – greys flowing into lavenders, 
and one star or a white gull suspended just so – too pale as usual. The critics would say 
it was too pale, for he was an unknown man exhibiting obscurely, a favourite with his 
landladies’ children, wearing a cross on his watch chain, and much gratified if his 
landladies liked his pictures – which they often did.11 
Again the passage begins with an unspecified perceiving instance; Archer’s 
calls could be heard by anyone in this place. Then the perspective slowly 
becomes that of Mrs. Flanders, with culmination at ›But a stamp?‹, which 
reflects her looking for a stamp. Afterwards, the text abruptly switches to 
external focalization (›ferreted in her bag …‹), which slowly turns into 
Steele’s perception of her, that is, into an internal focalization again. It is 
most clearly his perception when we reach the exclamation mark   
(› – confound her!‹), which reflects his emotional reaction to the scene as it 
appears to him. Finally, the perceiving instance roughly follows the turn of 
his head to the canvas and, seemingly, glides into his head, depicting his 
thoughts about his painting and his reputation as an artist. Such a 
wandering perceiving instance, from one character to another and in and 
out each time, demonstrates with particular clarity that the focal position 
is an entity of its own, independent from (albeit casually associating with) 
characters. However, there are two difficulties which I left out in my 
analysis.  
The first difficulty lies in the interdigitating of internal and external 
focalization. Similar to the switch from internal to external focalization in 
›But a stamp? She ferreted in her bag‹, there are changes of focalization 
regarding Mr. Steele: The facts that he wears a Panama hat, that he 
suspends his paint-brush, making it tremble, and that he finally dabs the 
_____________ 
11  Woolf: Jacob’s Room, p. 4. 
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canvas, are seen from outside. But between these events there is an 
internally focalized passage about how he sees Mrs. Flanders move and 
confound herself. This back and forth between internal and external 
focalization is a technique very common in passages centred on 
characters,12 and to lapse into an analysis of the sometimes very dense 
succession of multiple switches would miss the point. It would seem more 
reasonable to subsume both techniques under the notion of ›alignment‹, as 
it was used to describe similar phenomena with films:13  To ›align‹ a 
narration with a character means to seemingly walk about and keep close 
with him, applying internal focalizations (like in point-of-view shots) as 
well as external ones (like in close-up shots). One aim of alignment can be 
to provide ›subjective access‹ to a character; and sometimes external 
focalizations (showing an emotional reaction like that of the trembling 
paint-brush, for example) serve this purpose better than internal ones. 
Applying the concept of alignment, I can give a more homogenised 
description of the quoted passage, saying that it starts with an unspecified 
perceiving instance, which is then aligned with Mrs. Flanders, and then 
slowly turns into an alignment with Steele. 
The second difficulty is that internal focalizations (like free indirect 
discourse) are oftentimes ambiguous. For instance, the causal relation 
which is expressed in ›For the landscape needed it‹ is likely to be 
understood as a reflection by Steele, because it informs about his 
motivation to add the black-violet dab; but do we really know that it is his 
own comprehension of his motives (and not a supposition by the 
narrator)? The same question applies to the next sentences: ›It was too 
pale – […] – too pale as usual. The critics would say it was too pale […]‹. 
Do we know for sure whether these are Mr. Steele’s thoughts while gazing 
at his painting, or rather comments on the part of the narrator? And 
whose gaze on the picture is it then that is depicted in ›greys flowing into 
lavenders …‹: Mr. Steele’s or that of an anonymous perceiver? And whose 
knowledge is it when we are told that Steele is an ›unknown man‹ and that 
the landladies mostly like his pictures: his own or the narrator’s 
knowledge?  – If that sounds like (not really false, but) dispensable 
scepticism, I have achieved my aim. For it would confirm what I want to 
show: that we automatically yield to the above mentioned biases to 
_____________ 
12  Cf. Genette’s consideration that internal focalization (as a matter of entire narratives, 
not of single half sentences) is very rare and »fully realized only in the ›interior 
monologue‹, or in that borderline work, Robbe-Grillet’s La Jalousie, where the central 
character is limited absolutely to – and strictly inferred from – his focal position alone« 
(Genette: Discourse, p. 193). 
13  Smith: Characters, pp. 142–165.  
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anthropomorphize the perceiving instance and to synthesize it with any 
available subject in the text, even if the text does not provide sufficient 
clues to force such interpretation. See as a counter-example another 
passage: 
[…] for there her pen stuck; her eyes fixed, and tears slowly filled them. The entire bay 
quivered; the lighthouse wobbled; and she had the illusion that the mast of Mr. 
Connor’s little yacht was bending like a wax candle in the sun.14 
Here there is a reason intrinsic to the text to consider parts of the passage 
as internally focalized. For only Betty Flanders sees the bay quiver and the 
light house wobble, as she alone has tears in her eyes. We need to identify 
her as the focal position, because those perceptions cannot be reasonably 
ascribed  to a merely technical perceiving instance (›camera‹), or to the 
narrator. However, except for such rare cases of unambiguously internal 
focalization, the association of a focal position with the presence of a 
character must be regarded as something added by the reader, a mental 
construction which does not have its equivalent in the text. So where does 
the bias to build such specifying mental constructions come from? 
2  Psycho-Poetic (Side-)Effects 
My supposition is that the textual device of focalization relies on the same 
cognitive abilities which are involved in ordinary real-life experience, and 
that enacting those abilities automatically implies the idea of agency, 
because real-life experience is first-hand experience, that is, the experience 
of someone. In particular, anthropomorphic focalizations in a way mimic 
individual experience and thus evoke the idea of someone who is 
experiencing. My second claim will be that social cognition is a highly 
adaptive and highly rewarding mental occupation and that this is why we 
are prone to understand characters (or quasi-characters) wherever 
possible. 
These suppositions draw upon an observation made by John Tooby 
and Leda Cosmides, who wondered why people say so many things in the 
form of stories, while »there is no extrinsic reason why communicated 
information needs to be formatted in such a way«. They suggest that »our 
richest systems for information extraction and learning are designed to 
operate on our own experience«, because »we evolved not so long ago 
from organisms whose sole source of (non-innate) information was the 
individual’s own experience«. As a consequence, they consider it 
_____________ 
14  Woolf: Jacob’s Room, p. 3. 
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»inevitable, now that we can receive information through communication 
from others, that we should still process it more deeply when we receive it 
in a form that resembles individual experience […]. That is, we extract 
more information from inputs structured in such a form«.15 I think that 
the two modes of information gathering mentioned here – social 
communication and individual experience – correlate perfectly with 
Genette’s concepts of ›voice‹ and ›perception‹:16 The ›voice‹ aspect of a 
narrative should involve mainly those cognitive mechanisms which are 
associated with verbal communication, that is, semiotic faculties, memory, 
syntax logic, and the like; whereas the ›perception‹ aspect should run a 
simulation on the perceptual systems of our brains. A focalized depiction 
of a narrative situation thus should be processed by more or less the same 
second-order circuits as are involved with processing sensory inputs. 
If we assume this is true and that focalized narratives do generate an  
as-if simulation of first-hand experience on the reader’s mind,17 then the 
feeling of being in the place oneself and personally witnessing the fictional 
events would be kind of a natural by-product of the process. This would 
account for the idea of a vicarious ›I‹, which is somewhat mirrored in the 
concepts of a ›figural‹ perceiver, an ›invisible witness‹ or ›imaginative 
spectator‹.18 – But what about the second bias to associate this figural  
›as-if I‹ with a character or, respectively, the narrator?  
Tooby and Cosmides, when giving a closer description of what they 
mean by the story format, list a couple of ›preferences‹: 
People prefer to receive information in the form of stories. Textbooks, which are full 
of true information, but which typically lack a narrative structure, are almost never read 
for pleasure. We prefer accounts to have one or more persons from whose perspective 
we can vicariously experience the unfolding receipt of information, expressed in terms 
of temporally sequenced events (as experience actually comes to us), with an agent’s 
actions causing and caused by events (as we experience ourselves), in pursuit of 
intelligible purposes.19 
_____________ 
15  Cosmides / Tooby: Beauty, p. 24. 
16  This is my general hypothesis in Mellmann: Voice. 
17 Cf. Decety: Empathy, on neural correlates of a spatio-temporal ›sense of agency‹ 
(p. 257) and a natural bias ›toward self-perspective‹ (p. 258). 
18  Cf. Tan: Affect, and Tan: Emotion, for ›invisible witness‹; for ›imaginative spectator‹ 
cf. Smith: Characters. 
19  Cosmides / Tooby: Beauty, p. 24. See also Oatley / Gholamain: Emotions, p. 269: 
»following a plot requires that actions be understood as steps in plans. […] the basic 
modality of the fictional simulation is, therefore, that the actions of the protagonist are 
run on the planning processor of the reader or audience member. In real-world 
planning, we have a goal, and we arrange actions as steps in the plan to achieve it. In 
running a fictional simulation, we allow the text to guide our planning process, to steer 
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›Preference‹ in an evolutionary logic means something which is sustained 
by pleasure because it is highly adaptive and the organism shall be 
motivated to enact the related mechanisms as often as possible.20 Innate 
preferences should become manifest by statistical dominance of certain 
behaviours (compared to others) and/or higher frequency of occurrence 
than would seem apt for rational means or other reasons. In this sense, 
the fact that ›[p]eople prefer to receive information in the form of stories‹ 
may for now pass as commonsensical;21 yet this is kind of a meta-
preference, an across-the-board effect of several preferences served by 
›narrative structure‹ (including as various features as perspective, sequence, 
or agency), each of which would need closer examination individually. 
Note that the analogical structures of narrative texts and real-world 
experiences are not pleasurable per se, but they allow the text to function as 
kind of a dummy stimulus for several adaptive faculties which, performed 
in an ›organizational mode‹,22 may be pleasurable. In order to state a 
preference for focalized passages over unfocalized ones,23 and for 
anthropomorphic focalization over other focalization strategies, it might 
be sufficient to say that this simply enhances the text’s ability to cooperate 
with the human mind;24 but to explain why we prefer to ascribe the vision 
of the painting to Steele rather than to an anonymous perceiver, one has 
to ask for the reason why this should be more pleasurable than the non-
ascribed version.  
The answer would be that to regard Steele as the originator of the 
description of the canvas means to treat this passage as information about 
_____________ 
us through the actions of the narrative. Emotions are then experienced in relation to 
the goals and plans we have adopted, much as emotions occur in relation to goals in 
everyday life, happiness with achievements, sadness with losses, anger at frustrations, 
and so forth«. 
20  See Frijda: Pleasure, for a general survey on the psychological concept of pleasure; for 
an evolutionary perspective on several systems of ›aesthetic preference‹ – i.e. of 
»motivational systems […] that are designed to find rewarding the kinds of actions and 
experiences that would have been adaptive for our ancestors« see Cosmides / Tooby: 
Beauty, pp. 13f. 
21 Cf. Frey: Erfahrungshaftigkeit, with preliminary positive results in testing this 
preference empirically. 
22  Cosmides / Tooby: Beauty, p. 16. 
23  This preference (like all ›preferences‹ as referred to here) can of course be outrivaled, 
in a particular case, by another preference; for instance, if the unfocalized passages are 
employed to flesh out the narrator persona as a social stimulus by interspersing his 
ironic comments. 
24  In the sense of Oatley / Gholamain: Emotions, p. 273, saying that »fiction involves a 
discourse level and a range of techniques that allow the simulation to run properly on 
the human mind«. 
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Steele, that is, as fecund input for social cognition. The popular misbelief 
that we perceive fictional worlds somewhat ›through‹ characters in my 
opinion is induced by the fact that we never miss an opportunity to gather 
social information. A rectified version of that issue would be that we 
usually perceive fictional worlds directly (as a simulation of first-hand 
experience, granted by means of focalization), but that, at the same time, we 
use as much information as possible to draw conclusions about the social 
aspects of the fictional situation – that is, to feed our social cognition 
systems.  
As we have seen, the ›persons from whose perspective we can vica-
riously experience‹ do not need to be literal persons. On the other hand, 
passages without any character, like the above quoted examples, occur 
rather seldom indeed and, typically, in highly modern literature. The 
›classical‹ prototype of a story would rather begin with ›Once upon a time 
there was a king‹ than with ›Once upon a time there was a rock‹; and if it 
still did so, we would expect to be told immediately after about the role 
this rock played in some particular people’s lives. For, as was rightly 
claimed, fictional events hardly make sense but in relation to agents.25 
Actually, the very value of narrative and stories seems to be to provide us 
with complex social models.26 So, along with many others, I suppose that 
much of the pleasure we derive from fiction is due to its eliciting our 
social predispositions (cognitive as well as emotional ones).27  
Take for instance the detective novel: this ›whodunnit‹ genre is almost 
exclusively designed to address our capabilities for evaluating people in 
accordance with the ›good guy‹/›bad guy‹ schema,28 for mind reading, and 
›detecting the cheater‹.29 The popularity of this genre may be a hint that 
cognitions of this sort are highly rewarding; and to always be aware of 
another’s intentions, the friendly as well as the hostile ones, should indeed 
have enhanced the survival and reproductive success of our ancestors. 
Similar things can be said about other complex social programs such as, 
for instance, evaluating the hierarchical status of each member of a group, 
_____________ 
25  Scalise Sugiyama: Narrative, pp. 183–185. 
26  Cf. Oatley / Mar: Pre-adaptations.  
27  See, for example, Zunshine: Fiction, who connects the study of how texts trigger and 
exploit our capacity for mindreading with the question of ›why we read fiction‹; further 
elaborated (and more explicitly drawing on evolutionary aesthetics) in Zunshine: Mind. 
28  There is reason to understand this schema as part of a separate mechanism equipped 
with a separate memory of its own, for even people with completely impaired memory 
function are able to subliminally recognize someone who has been positive to them 
(cf. Damasio: Feeling, pp. 43–47). 
29  Cf. Cosmides / Tooby: Social reasoning. 
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR Objects of ›Empathy‹ 
 
427 
which requires permanent attention to their behaviour, memory in order 
to prepare potential coalitions, continuous reflection on what is good and 
bad from an ethical standpoint, and so on; another such program is social 
learning, which involves continuous observation too, and reflection on 
which behaviours are successful and which are not.30 Intensely social 
animals that they are, humans possess plenty of those predispositions to 
reflect on and react to their social environment, be it real or fictional.31 
Actually, this is how fictional characters emerge. As William James once 
said: we do not cry, because we are sorry, but we feel sorry because we 
cry.32 Similarly it could be said: we do not cogitate on social facts because 
we face literary characters, but we figure out personal entities because our 
social dispositions have been activated. They are triggered by a special 
kind of information which is appropriate to be used as social information. 
This is how characters become alive, and ›round‹; we fill them out by 
thinking about them, driven by our intrinsic interest in other ›members of 
the group‹ and making use of any available information. When mental 
processes, of whatever kind (emotional, perceptual, cognitive), thus entail, 
as mental by-product, the idea of animate beings (like for instance 
characters, but also ›narrator‹, ›figural perceiver‹, etc.), I speak of ›psycho-
poetic effects‹, that is, the effect of ›making psyche‹ by imagining a psychic 
entity.33 So what happens exactly when we understand a perceiving 
instance as an anthropomorphic entity ›walking on two legs‹, rather than a 
mere technical instance of ›camera‹? And what happens when we equip 
this anthropomorphic instance with a fully-fledged human psyche, having 
intentions and feelings?  
3  Reverse-Engineering ›Empathy‹ 
What kind of information is it that is appropriate to be taken as social 
information? I shall give some suggestions for textual clues possibly 
corresponding to the releaser schema of particular routines of social 
cognition;34 – which also means to dissect the broad popular concept of 
_____________ 
30  Cf. Eibl: Animal, pp. 194f. 
31  Cf. Norris / Cacioppo: I Know, pp. 88f., 90–95. 
32 James:  Emotion. 
33  Mellmann: Emotionalisierung, pp. 99–103. 
34  Cf., as a similar attempt, the list of probable sub-mechanisms involved in ›theory of 
mind‹ which Jannidis: Intention, pp. 191–197, deploys referring to findings from 
recent developmental psychology and primatology; similar lines of argument in Lauer: 
Spiegelneuronen. 
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›empathy‹ into a number of specific adaptations, which together constitute 
our capacity for empathic experience. This procedure conforms to what is 
called  ›reverse-engineering‹35 in evolutionary psychology and helps to 
identify the very entities of a complex design to which we can attribute 
specific adaptive functions.36 
For instance, the information that something is moving may belong to 
one type of socially relevant information, for we have reasons to assume 
there is a specific cognitive algorithm for distinguishing animate from 
inanimate objects by self-propelled movement.37  Think of Steele’s 
trembling paint-brush: As we are not told that his hand would tremble, 
but his paint-brush itself (›like the antennae of some irritable insect‹!), the 
paint-brush might momentarily gain qualities of an animate being and thus 
produce a slightly eerie effect on the reader. Action verbs may represent 
another type of socially significant triggers, because they indicate someone 
doing something and thus appeals to our ability to infer intentions and 
goals from animated motion.38 See for instance phrases like ›A daddy-
long-legs shot from corner to corner‹, ›A fish darts across‹, or ›and out 
pushes an opal-shelled crab‹: Of course semantic memory helps enough to 
understand that a daddy-long-legs, a fish and a crab are animals, but if 
they are shown as ›shooting from A to B‹, ›darting across‹, or ›pushing 
out‹, they gain real life in the imagination of the reader, for he assumes 
there is kind of an intention in their action. Generally, words indicating 
intentionality and motivation perform the same function, like for instance 
the adverbs in ›A single leaf tapped hurriedly, persistently, upon the glass‹.  
As you might have noticed, those basic social triggers roughly pertain 
to what are known as the stylistic devices of ›personification‹ and 
›prosopopoeia‹ from classical rhetoric, making it possible to play psycho-
_____________ 
35  Tooby / Cosmides: Foundations, p. 61. 
36  See also my critique of less strictly ›adaptationist‹ argumentations in the final section of 
Mellmann: Heuristic. – To give an example from physical evolution: The human hand 
as a whole is of course highly adaptive (as is ›empathy‹). But if I consider the human 
hand as ›an adaptation‹, I have to cope with a multitude of potentially adaptive 
functions (grasping, feeding, waving, beating, picking one’s nose …) and will fail to 
determine both the crucial function for which it was selected and the actually selected 
entity (for the human hand is not an entirely new design of the human species but the 
result of many a proto-design appearing throughout animal evolution). A more 
reasonable method of adaptationist analysis would be to look at one particular feature 
of the hand, for instance the opposable thumb, and to ask for its particular adaptive 
value. 
37 See  Stone:  Perspective,  pp.  320–322, and the literature reported in Blythe / Todd / 
Miller: Motion, p. 261, and Zunshine: Strange, pp. 6–14, 15. 
38  Cf. Stone: Perspective, pp. 322f., and Blythe / Todd / Miller: Motion. 
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poetic effects even on inanimate objects or abstract concepts. Compara-
bly, clues of movement and intention can be used to animate an inanimate 
perceiving instance: If, for instance, the perceiving instance in Mrs. 
Pearce’s empty front room does not only look at the oil lamp on the table, 
but also at the garden out the window, then again back at the objects lying 
around in the room and, finally, at the corners where the daddy-long-legs 
shoots back and forth, it performs kind of a movement of the ›head‹, if 
not the whole ›body‹, which arouses the imagination of an animate being 
capable of autonomous movement. Moreover, if the focalization of a text 
thus performs kind of a zoom, changing from a rather wide scope of 
perception to the selective depiction of individual spots and details, or the 
inverse, or if it lingers longer at a place, we might infer from this 
movement ›behaviour‹ kind of an intention – which we normally ascribe 
to the ›voice‹ instance (the narrator), but which here aditionally vivifies the 
perceptual instance, so that it tends to be merged with the narrator in the 
mind of the reader.  
Focalization strategies like zooming or lingering do not only trigger our 
inference systems for detecting other people’s intentions (known as the 
›theory of mind‹39 module), but may also meet our disposition for ›shared 
intentionality‹ or ›joint attention‹,40 that is, for directing our attention in 
accordance with another, which might be a subunit of social learning 
programs. The sentence ›There was a hurricane out at sea‹, for instance, 
signals attention to a particular circumstance and invites the reader to 
follow this selective concentration. This effect often goes along with the 
use of perception verbs, like if the sentence was: ›One could hear the 






39  I use this term in the narrow sense of ›theories about another’s intentions, beliefs, and 
desires‹. For a critique of broader conceptions (like, for instance, Sperber’s and 
Wilson’s proposition of a ›comprehension module‹) with empiricist arguments see 
Ermer et al.: Theory; for a comprehensive discussion on ›ToM‹ that convincingly 
differentiates between several domain-specific sub-mechanisms, including an implicit 
›mentalism‹, and domain-general capacities that, among others, also subserve ToM-
tasks see Stone: Perspective (especially pp. 319f., 332–337). 
40  Cf. Jannidis: Intention, p. 195, Lauer: Spiegelneuronen, p. 148, and Stone: Perspective, 
pp. 323–329. 
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The two women murmured over the spirit-lamp, plotting the eternal conspiracy of hush 
and clean bottles while the wind raged and gave a sudden wrench at the cheap 
fastenings. 
Both looked round at the cot. Their lips were pursed. Mrs. Flanders crossed over to the 
cot. 
›Asleep?‹ whispered Rebecca, looking at the cot. 
Mrs. Flanders nodded.41 
We are tempted to follow their look at the cot, even if the pertaining view 
is not specifically depicted in the text. We even might figure it out on our 
own instead: Did you imagine a vision of the cot while reading this 
passage (or even of Mrs. Flanders’ view into the cot, of the sleeping baby)? 
If so, you have obeyed the very social algorithm hypothesized here.  
The capacities of guessing another’s intentions or following another’s 
attention are core components of the meta-capacity to ›understand the 
other‹, another important sub-program of which surely is the ability to 
create empathic representations of another’s inner states. Empathic 
mental representations can be induced, for instance, by use of perceptual 
adjectives. For example, the remark that ›it was hot; rather sticky and 
steamy‹42 in the room requires the imagination of a perceiver endowed 
with a human sensory system and of how these perceptions feel to him. 
Another source of empathy triggers is the depicting of various emotional 
display behaviours. When we are told, for example, that Betty Flanders is 
»pressing her heels rather deeper in the sand«,43 that she has tears in her 
eyes, or that Steele’s paint-brush is trembling, we may make elaborate 
guesses about their states of mind. This is more than only inferring 
intentions or motives, or sharing in somebody’s directed attention; it also 
includes a mental representation of complex sensual data (like feelings and 
sensations) and of complex cognitive frames (like individual beliefs, a 
particular set of values and level of information).  
The strikingly sensuous quality of empathic representations is what 
most people first think of when talking about empathy or about 
experiencing fictional worlds ›through characters‹. And in this view, 
empathy is often understood as an emotional experience. I do not think 
that this is correct, and that is why I have to add another section on 
empathy.44 
_____________ 
41  Woolf: Jacob’s Room, p. 8. 
42 Cf.  note  8. 
43  Woolf: Jacob’s Room, p. 3. 
44 I do not attempt to list and discuss the numerous theories of ›empathy‹ (and 
›sympathy‹, ›identification‹, and so on) in literary and, especially, film studies before and 
after the ›cognitive turn‹ (some of them being more, others less compatible with what I 
am suggesting in the following section). When, in what follows, I content myself with 
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4  ›Empathy‹ Revisited 
Browsing handbooks of psychological emotion theory, one will rarely find 
articles on empathy. Publications on empathy are numerous, but, most of 
the time, without clear affiliation with the domains of emotion research or 
cognitive sciences; they rather stand alone (or, in the context of 
developmental psychology) and sometimes tend to reproduce a ›folk 
theory‹ of empathy, that is, they treat (or rather, celebrate) empathy as a 
highly valued prosocial endowment for ›sharing‹ the emotions of others. 
This imprecise notion of empathy has grown particularly virulent after the 
discovery of ›mirror neurons‹.45 Vilayanur S. Ramachandran has coined 
the unfortunate abbreviation term »›empathy neurons‹ or ›Dalai Llama 
neurons‹« that, »it would seem, dissolve the barrier between self and 
others«.46 While it is true that empathic imaginations show an eminently 
sensuous quality (and thus resemble emotional experience) and that this 
might indeed be due to neural ›mirroring‹ processes (or similar phenome-
na),47 there is no worth in metaphors suggesting miraculous fusions of self 
and other, or a kind of wired connection between them. Actually, it is 
important to keep in mind the fundamental ›barrier‹ between self and 
other, because otherwise we would not be able to differentiate between 
someone experiencing an emotion and someone imagining that experience.48 
The first may have a mental representation of his feeling too though, and 
it is quite possible that it closely resembles that one which the latter will 
elaborate by means of empathy; yet the first will show both the elicitation 
of an emotion program and a second-order representation of this process, 
while the latter shows a mental representation only – which, moreover, will 
have come about very differently and does not result from monitoring 
processes within the same nervous system. When I, in the following, 
speak of ›empathy‹, I understand by it »a form of complex psychological 
inference in which observation, memory, knowledge, and reasoning are 
combined to yield insights into the thoughts and feelings of another« and 
to construct a complex mental representation of his state of mind.49 To 
_____________ 
arguing against an anonymous ›popular notion‹ of empathy, note that this ›popular 
notion‹ is not a mere straw man, but has indeed strongly influenced most of the 
numerous conceptions of ›empathy‹ I have come across both in the humanities and the 
sciences. 
45  See also Batson: Things, and Decety: Empathy, pp. 248–250. 
46  Ramachandran: Mirror, par. 15. 
47 See  note  62. 
48  Cf. Heberlein / Adolphs: Neurobiology, p. 46, and Decety: Empathy, pp. 258f. 
49  Ickes: Introduction, p. 2; see also Decety: Empathy, pp. 248, 263f. 
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make more plausible why it does make sense to confine the term that way, 
I shall explain (a)  what emotional experience, as opposed to empathic 
imagination, is, (b) what is understood by ›emotional contagion‹, (c) what 
role empathic imaginations play in social emotions, and, finally, (d) what it 
is, probably, that brings about the sensuous quality of empathic 
imaginations. 
(a) To experience an emotion means that, to begin with, an emotion 
program is triggered. That is, a highly domain-specific situation schema is 
matched by a stimulus and thus initialises an equally highly domain-
specific super-ordinate program of several sub-mechanisms. Those super-
ordinate programs were shaped by evolution as ›best-bet responses‹ to 
statistically reoccurring situations of selective significance. Involved sub-
mechanisms include bodily changes as well as cognitive readjustments.50 
The neural second-order monitoring of these processes is what can show 
up as ›feeling‹ in the experiencing subject’s conscious mind.51  
It is quite possible that two people’s emotional experiences closely 
parallel one another, for instance if both respond to the same stimulus and 
the respective emotion is a very ›basic‹ one (that is, with a high percentage 
of ›hard-wired‹ innate sub-mechanisms and a low percentage of 
individually ›learned‹ elements and modifications). Furthermore, not many 
but some emotion programs provide another possibility of paralleling two 
people’s feelings by featuring their own ›output‹ of emotional display 
behaviour also as part of their releasing mechanism, that is, as an 
additional releaser:52 for instance, seeing a weeping face may produce the 
impulse to weep oneself; seeing someone smile may produce the impulse 
to smile oneself; seeing someone’s eyes widen with fear may also 
spontaneously excite an anxious feeling in the beholder, and so on.  
(b) Phenomena of that kind are traditionally known as ›emotional 
contagion‹. Yet it is important to note that emotional contagion is no 
general principle, but occurs only with a limited number of emotional 
behaviours (like, particularly, crying and laughing) and reflexes (for 
_____________ 
50 This model of emotions follows Cosmides / Tooby: Emotions. Cf. also Scherer: 
Emotion, and Mellmann: Emotionalisierung, pp. 23–41. 
51 Cf. William James’ above quoted view on emotions (cf. note 32), or Damasio’s 
distinction of ›emotion‹ – for the objective process of activating and performing an 
emotion program – and ›feeling‹  – for the sensing of the consequences of the 
activation as a mental image which can be made conscious (Damasio: Feeling, pp. 37, 
55, 79, and passim). 
52  The terms of ›releasing mechanism‹ (RM) and ›releaser‹ (key stimulus) are taken from 
behavioural ecology. 
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instance, retching and yawning),53 and, which is interesting, in infancy on a 
larger scale than with adults. It seems that it has been adaptive to attune 
and synchronize some (but not all) behaviours among group members, 
and especially to accord some of a child’s reactions with those of its adult 
caregivers, as a still-developing organism may not yet be able to fully asses 
a situation on its own. Thus, emotional contagion seems to be a 
specifically adaptive algorithm itself, which applies only to very specific 
conditions; it cannot account for a general ›transmission‹ of feeling from 
one individual to another.  
Another case of parallel emotional experience is often assumed for 
some social emotions, especially pity. According to folk psychology, when 
we cry with pity we cry because of sort of ›sharing‹ the sadness of the 
pitied person. In terms of films showing close-up shots of a weeping face, 
I would say that emotional contagion or emotional programs elicited by 
contextual information (like the one intruduced below) would do to 
explain the impulse to cry on the part of the spectator; there is no need to 
claim that he cries with pity. It may be that he also feels pity, but the crying 
response is not very likely to result from this particular emotion. At least it 
would be hard to confirm this claim from an evolutionary standpoint, for 
pity as an adaptive prosocial program would be expected to coordinate 
actions of assistance and shelter,54 and bursting out in tears would seem 
rather dysfunctional in this context. Yet there is another emotional 
response which applies to ›pitiful‹ stimuli (among others) and which does 
include the impulse to cry: the response of ›sentiment‹ as it has been 
described by Ed Tan and Nico Frijda. The sentimental response, 
according to them, is an archaic capitulation response toward the 
overwhelming, which can be triggered by »any major resolution in a 
conflict« involving basic human concerns (like attachment, justice, 
survival).55 That given, it is indeed possible that someone feels like crying 
when facing the fact that somebody has been done irremediable harm; 
much the same way as he may cry at two lovers’ reunion, the birth of a 
baby, virtue’s triumph, and so on (because ›any major resolution‹ signifies 
the positive as well as the negative ones). In fine, what appears to be 
›crying with pity‹ at first sight, more likely is a compound response, 
_____________ 
53  For the example of laughing cf. Gervais / Wilson: Laughter, pp. 402f., 413, 415. 
54  Cf. Decety: Empathy, pp. 247f., and Mellmann: Emotionalisierung, pp. 125f., on pity 
as an emotional adaptation resulting from ›inclusive fitness‹. 
55  Tan / Frijda: Sentiment, p. 54. 
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involving further emotion programs beyond pity (or even doing 
without).56  
(c) Nevertheless, pity can be said to be an ›empathic‹ emotion, albeit in 
quite a different sense than in that of emotional transmission. As it is 
rather difficult to become aware of the fact that someone has been done 
harm and needs consolation and help (and of what kind) without guessing 
what he feels like, the emotion of pity somewhat relies on empathy. In that 
way, an empathic imagination is the initial trigger – or at least a crucial 
sub-mechanism in the emotion episode – of several social emotions. As 
Tan puts it: 
I refer to emotions as empathic regardless of whether the character’s emotions parallel 
those of the viewers; what matters is that the character’s understanding of the situation 
is relevant for the viewer’s emotion. Thus, pity is an empathic emotion, as is schaden-
freude, where the viewer’s feelings contrast with what is understood to be the 
character’s (negative) appraisal of the situation. However, if the viewers were not aware 
of that appraisal they would not experience schadenfreude.57 
In this sense, ›empathy‹ again does not denote any kind of transmission of 
an individual’s emotional experience, but, as said above, ›a form of 
complex psychological inference‹ on the part of the beholder, here as 
necessary part of some socially directed emotion programs.58  
(d) As the foregoing should have made clear, empathy as a component 
of the capacity to ›understand the other‹ is not per se an emotional 
experience. Nevertheless, there is something like a ›feeling‹ in empathy, 
some sensuous quality in imagining another’s inner state. We seem to feel 
what it is like to stand in a hot and sticky room, to press one’s heels 
deeper in the sand, to feel sad for certain reasons, and so on. This peculiar 
feeling might be due to what Antonio Damasio has called the ›as-if-body-
loop‹.59  
Body states are represented in the brain by several neural second-order 
maps in body-sensing regions. If this process goes its ›normal‹ way, that is, 
if the representation is the result of signals hailing from the body, 
Damasio speaks of direct simulation, or the ›body-loop‹. Yet it seems that 
the representation mechanisms can also be activated by cognitive 
stimulation, that is, by signals coming from »certain brain regions, such as 
_____________ 
56 Cf. my suggestion to reformulate Lessing’s concept of ›weinendes Mitleiden‹ as a 
combination of a malperformance of the pity program and a subsequently triggered 
capitulation response in Mellmann: Emotionalisierung, pp. 128–131. 
57 Tan:  Affect,  p.  18f. 
58 Cf.  note  49. 
59  Damasio: Descartes; Damasio: Feeling; Damasio: Spinoza. 
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the prefrontal/premotor cortices«.60 This is what he calls internal brain 
simulation, or the ›as-if-body-loop‹, because the somatosensory maps 
respond only ›as if‹ a sensuous experience had taken place, while there are 
no actually incoming signals from the body. Damasio considers the as-if-
body-loop to be crucial for any process of mental simulation, including 
empathy. He draws on a study by Ralph Adolph which shows that 
patients with damage in brain regions concerned with accomplishing »the 
highest level of integrated mapping of body state« were not able to 
correctly identify emotional facial expressions.61 »In the absence of this 
region«, Damasio suggests,  
it is not possible for the brain to simulate other body states effectively. The brain lacks 
the playground where variations on the body-state theme can be played. […] In 
summary, the body-sensing areas constitute a sort of theater where not only the ›actual‹ 
body states can be ›performed‹, but varied assortments of ›false‹ body states can be 
enacted as well, for example, as-if-body states, filtered body states, and so on.62 
Damasio believes that the as-if-body-loop mechanism draws »on a 
variant«63 of the neural mirror system as described by Giacomo Rizzolatti 
and Vittorio Gallese.64 And he does right to phrase rather cautiously here, 
because exactly how the many recent findings in the domain of neural 
simulation and empathy relate to one another is anything but clear at the 
moment.65 ›Mirror neurons‹ is the name of neurons firing not only while 
performing, but also while observing an action. Note that what was 
initially observed is the mirroring of visually observed (and markedly 
specific)  motoric actions.66  Thus, a macaque’s brain mirrors targeted 
_____________ 
60  Damasio: Spinoza, p. 115. 
61  Ibid., p. 117. For the study cf. Adolphs: Role. 
62  Ibid., pp. 117f. 
63  Ibid., pp. 115f. 
64  For two attempts at integrating the discovery of mirror neurons in literary theory see 
Lauer: Spiegelneuronen, and Salgaro: Stories, both of which in my opinion overstate 
the significance of mirror neurons in explaining literature; similar, albeit more cautious 
considerations in Lindenberger: Arts, pp. 15f. 
65  Cf. the critical surveys by Heberlein / Adolphs: Neurobiology, and Shamay-Tsoory: 
Empathic; also, from the humanities, Borg: Mirror, Wübben: Lesen, pp. 34–36, and 
Koepsell / Spoerhase: Neuroscience. 
66  Cf. Rizzolatti / Arbib: Language, p. 188: »The response properties of mirror neurons 
to visual stimuli can be summarized as follows: mirror neurons do not discharge in 
response to object presentation; in order to be triggered they require a specific 
observed action. The majority of them respond selectively when the monkey observes 
one type of action (such as grasping). Some are highly specific, coding not only the 
action aim, but also how that action is executed. They fire, for example, during 
observation of grasping movements, but only when the object is grasped with the 
index finger and the thumb«. 
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movements, and subjects who are confronted with pictures of emotional 
facial expressions activate the respective muscular groups of their own 
faces. However, Damasio’s model of the as-if-body-loop describes a 
neural mirroring of cognitive information about somatosensory states. While I 
think it a plausible supposition that these are quite similar phenomena, I 
am most sceptical about the inference of a general principle of neural 
mirroring which would suggest an all-purpose mechanism mirroring whatever 
kind of information about whatever kind of another’s activity or 
experience. Indeed, there is some evidence that the mirroring of motoric 
acts in macaques can also be stimulated cognitively, as the effect is the 
same when the action is partly hidden or only heard.67 The more in 
humans, whose mirror systems respond even to merely mimed actions 
(without real object, for example).68 Furthermore, emotion recognition 
seems to involve »a similar mechanism« as is involved in action 
recognition:69 In terms of at least some basic emotions, like for instance 
disgust, there are findings which indicate that the sight of the correspond-
ing facial expression produces partly the same neural maps as an 
individual’s own experience of that emotion.70 But these emotional maps 
still involve different cortical regions than Damasio’s body-sensing maps71 
and perhaps are more likely to prepare emotional contagion processes 
than empathic feelings.72 – As matters stand, the default hypothesis should 
be that neural mirroring is an abstraction from many quite specific sub-
mechanisms built into specific adaptive programs, rather than a detached 
all-purpose mechanism. This supposition fits with the observation that the 
human mirror system responds more eagerly if the observed action has a 
perceptible goal or intention, and if this goal is a rather biologically ›basic‹ 
than culturally learned one, like for instance drinking in comparison to 
_____________ 
67  Gallese / Keysers / Rizzolatti: View, p. 397. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid.,  p.  397. 
70  Ibid., pp. 399f.; Gervais / Wilson: Laughter, p. 405; Heberlein / Adolphs: Neurobio-
logy, pp. 40–42. 
71 Gallese / Keysers / Rizzolatti: View, p.  400, and Rizzolatti / Sinigaglia: Mirrors, 
pp. 187–189. See also Heberlein / Adolphs: Neurobiology, pp. 42–44. 
72 Existing  neuroimaging  experiments  have  concentrated on only a handful of affective 
states, including pain, fear, disgust and, more rarely, anger – all of which are possible 
instances of emotional contagion. Moreover, the performance of mirror neurons in 
perspective-taking tasks seems poorer than one would expect if mirror neurons are 
taken to provide a crucial substrate for empathic imagination (see Pfeifer / Dapretto: 
Mirror); rather it seems that empathy even works in patients who lack the neural 
circuits necessary for first-order mirroring (see Danziger / Faillenot / Peyron: Can 
We).  
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cleaning.73 Findings of this kind strongly suggest that neural mirroring 
circuits always pertain to particular basic behavioural systems,74 the 
identification of which should be at least as important as the observation 
that they involve mirroring processes.75 Examples of such basic 
behavioural systems may be the above mentioned ones of mind reading, 
cheater detection, social learning, social status assessment, and the like.  
To come back to literary characters: Programs of social cognition which 
are likely to be prerequisite to processes of neural mirroring are also likely 
to be prerequisite to psycho-poetic effects, because their activity, in the 
first place, identifies socially relevant information as such. Without those 
programs, textual information about people would remain pallid just as 
the textual device of focalization would remain pallid without the 
corresponding cognitive programs of individual experience. Since humans 
developed the art of storytelling, it is of course hardly surprising that the 
nature and properties of narratives in a way reproduce and reflect the 
nature and properties of the human mind. Consequently, the challenge 
within a perspective of ›cognitive poetics‹ aiming at more than speaking 
truisms would be to determine the particular mechanisms involved in this 
relationship. What I tried to show in this paper is that this aim is not 
achieved by simply replacing traditional aesthetic notions like mimesis, 
imagination or character with more ›mentalist‹ concepts like imitation, 
simulation or person schema, or by correlating it with assumed 
psychological verities like empathy, neural mirroring, or similarly broad 
concepts; but that the description of the mind probably requires the same 
grade of differentiation and functional analysis as the description of a text; 
and that the heuristic question of whether a particular cognitive routine 
could have evolved as a specifically adaptive algorithm may help us come 
closer to demounting the too-broad concepts of our intuitive psychologi-
cal kowledge. It is needless to say that there still remains a lot to be done 
and that I could only draw a rough sketch of the field. 
_____________ 
73  Iacoboni et al.: Grasping, p. 533, and Iacoboni: Revolution, pp. 447f. 
74 See, as an example, a special mechanism for laughter contagion as proposed by 
Gervais / Wilson: Laughter, p. 406. 
75  Similarly Gervais / Wilson: Laughter, p. 406, arguing that »the neural bases of laughter 
and yawn contagion should not necessarily be the same« and that »the two behaviors 
deserve to be evaluated on their own terms and only then compared«. 
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